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Abstract
This paper studies the role of taxation and bequest motives in households’ demand for life
insurance. We develop a stylized three-period life cycle model of life insurance demand and
test its predictions regarding tax changes and bequests motives. An unexpected halving of
the tax exemption limit for interest and dividend income in Germany allows us to identify
the impact of changes in taxation on the demand for life insurance in a difference-in-
differences setting. In line with our theoretical predictions, we document that ownership of
life insurance products increased significantly among households affected by the reform. We
also find some evidence of a more pronounced response among households with stronger
bequest motives.
JEL CODES: D91, C25, D14, G11
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1 Introduction
In the face of ageing populations and increasing fiscal burdens, many governments
feel pressed to raise taxes in order to sustain their budgets and public pension schemes.
At the same time, existing preferential tax rules are often maintained to avoid offend-
ing voters or because they serve a specific policy goal. A typical example for the latter
is the preferential tax treatment of private retirement savings, which many countries
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introduced during the past years to encourage these savings amid the reduced gener-
osity of existing pay-as-you-go pension systems. However, in the presence of preferen-
tial tax rules, tax changes may lead to potentially unintended effects.
This paper studies one example of such tax change. In Germany, the personal in-
come tax exemption on interest and dividend income was cut to half in 2000.
Interest on whole life insurance remained, however, tax free, continuing to benefit
its preferential status as one of the most popular financial assets used to save for re-
tirement. This natural experiment allows us to identify a ‘treatment-group’, which are
those households whose interest and dividend income moved from below to above the
exemption limit. We apply a difference-in-differences strategy to test the predictions of
a life cycle model of household saving behavior as regards the sensitivity of life insur-
ance demand to tax incentives and bequest motives.
Life insurance is the second most common asset after savings accounts in Germany.
In 2012, 16% of total private wealth, accumulating to 799 billion Euro, was allocated
to life insurance (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014). Of the 89 million existing life insur-
ance policies, 6 million had been sold in that year, and the total annual premium
paid by Germans was 62 billion Euro, corresponding to a total insured sum of
2,748 billion Euro (GDV, 2013). Following the tax reform we study in this paper,
life insurance demand rose also sizeably. In the 3 years before and after tax change,
the average newly insured volume of life insurance increased from 115 billion Euro
before to around 160 billion Euro per year after the reform.
Not only in view of the sums involved, but also for theoretical reasons, studying the
demand for whole life insurance ownership has significant appeal as it allows testing
for both the importance of tax incentives and bequest motives in households’ savings
decisions. This paper explores these two aspects by developing a three-periods-of-life
model of household behavior in which death is uncertain and a household has both
bonds and whole life insurance in its portfolio. This model is intended to highlight
key effects of tax changes and bequest motives on life insurance demand in a more
general environment than the German economy. It therefore abstracts from certain
real-life complexities, including the presence of other tax-favored assets than life in-
surance. The main prediction of the model is that households facing higher relative
tax rates on other savings should purchase more whole life insurance to accommodate
a more downward-sloping consumption profile. Furthermore, this effect should be
more pronounced among households with stronger bequest motives.
These predictions are tested empirically by exploiting the changes in the German
tax law. The reduction in the tax-exempted amount of interest and dividend income
created a strong incentive among previously exempted households to shelter their sav-
ings from taxation by investing in (tax-exempt) life insurance contracts. In contrast to
the prior literature, this reform allows us to analyze tax incentives at the margin fol-
lowing a large tax shock for a well-defined sub-sample of the population, rather than
relying on responses to incremental changes in after-tax returns (which are usually
correlated with income changes).
A second aspect of life-insurance demand studied in this paper relates to the im-
portance of bequest motives for saving decisions. Our theoretical model predicts a
more pronounced effect of tax reductions among households with stronger bequest
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motive, which we test by analyzing the response of households that are naturally
expected to have stronger bequest motives: married couples and households with
children.
The empirical analysis uses data for the years 1996 to 2001 from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), which contains a yes/no question on whether a house-
hold owns any life insurance. The SOEP does not contain information on the
amounts saved or aggregate household wealth during the period of interest. Hence,
the data allow testing if treated households increased their life insurance demand at
the extensive margin (i.e., raised their participation) in response to the tax change
using a linear and a non-linear difference-in-differences estimator. Rather than the
year 2000 when the reform was implemented, we choose 1999 as reference year,
given that the tax law had been passed by March 1999, so that households could an-
ticipate the reform. This anticipation effect was further fostered by a parallel proposal
in June 1999 – which eventually was not passed – that would have abolished the tax
exemption on life insurance returns altogether by the end of 1999. As the proposal
would not have affected contracts sold before end-1999 it was an additional driver
of demand.
The difference-in-differences estimates confirm the predictions of our stylized theor-
etical model of life-insurance demand. First, the probability of owning tax-exempt
whole life insurance contracts increases by 5.2% among households affected by the
tax reform (i.e., among those households losing their tax exemption). We also find
that households largely anticipated the tax change, increasing their demand for life
insurance already in 1999. Second, this effect is larger for married couples (6.4%)
and households with children (9.1%), whereas the reform has no significant effect
on unmarried households. Although the estimated effects are substantial, they are
still conservative in our view, given we are only able to capture changes at the exten-
sive margin. If microdata would have been collected at the time that would have
allowed to also take the intensive margin into account, the estimates would probably
be bigger. Moreover, if microdata on overall household wealth or asset holdings were
available, the paper could have established more thoroughly if the higher participa-
tion in tax-favored assets occurred at the expense of other assets or if it was driven
by an increase in overall savings among those affected by the reform. With the avail-
able evidence, it can be concluded that the treated increased their participation also in
other tax-favored assets such as building savings contracts or business capital, while
macrodata indicate a portfolio shift from savings accounts (which are not tax-favored)
into life insurance after the reform.
This paper proceeds with a review of past literature on the topic in Section 2. It then
derives testable predictions from a stylized model of life-insurance demand in Section
3 and introduces two reduced-form regression models to tests these in Section
4. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 analyzes the impact of the German tax re-
form on life-insurance demand. The importance of bequest motives is studied in
Section 7. The robustness of the results is evaluated in Section 8. Section 9 provides
a summary and conclusions.
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Past empirical evidence on the importance of such tax incentives has been inconclu-
sive and largely relied on studying incremental changes in marginal tax rates.
Scholz (1994) finds little evidence that households modified their portfolios in re-
sponse to the 1986 US Tax Reform Act. Also, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, 2007)
do not find significant changes in the demand for life insurance and mortgage debt
by those households most affected by incremental tax reforms in Italy. On the
other hand, several studies that use cross-sectional data report a positive correlation
between marginal tax rates and investments channeled into tax-sheltered assets:
Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (1997) for the Netherlands, Agell and Edin
(1990) for Sweden, Banks and Tanner (2002) for the UK, and finally King and
Leape (1998), Poterba (2002), and Poterba and Samwick (2003) for the USA. Yet
in cross-sections, it is difficult to disentangle variation in marginal tax rates from vari-
ation in income, because after-tax-yields depend on changing marginal tax rates
which in turn vary with income levels that on their own are surely affecting savings
decisions.1 Alan et al. (2010) try to address this multicollinearity problem by exploit-
ing differences in marginal taxes rates within households. Such differences exist in
countries with individual taxation, such as Canada. For more affluent households,
they find that portfolio choices respond to tax incentives within the household.
Past empirical studies also disagree about the strength of bequest motives.
Estimates of the share of bequests in aggregate private savings range from 17%
(Modigliani, 1988) to 46% (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981). Cross-country evidence
shows that life-insurance demand is higher in countries with a high dependency
ratio (Browne and Kim, 1993), high income per capita, low inflation, and a high de-
gree of banking sector development (Beck and Webb, 2003). At the household level,
Bernheim (1991) finds that a significant fraction of life-insurance demand and con-
sumption can be motivated by the desire to leave bequests to one’s children.
Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) estimate that households with a bequest motive save
about 25% more, whereas Hurd (1987, 1989) finds that the marginal utility from
bequests in a consumption-savings model is close to zero. Data based on direct survey
questions on the intention to leave a bequest has been used by Laitner and Juster
(1996) and Jürges (2001). Although both find that bequest motives shape savings be-
havior, altruism toward one’s children appears to be of only minor importance. In
contrast, Inkmann and Michaelides (2012) and Sauter (2014) find evidence for the ex-
istence of bequest motives in life insurance demand among households with children
as well as for married couples in the UK and the former German Democratic
Republic, respectively.
3 A life-cycle model with tax incentives and bequests
Life insurance is one of the most popular financial assets, used by a large number of
households in many countries to save for retirement (Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli,
1 In fact, in his seminal contribution, Feldstein (1976) uses labor income as a proxy for the marginal tax
rate.
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2002). In its simplest form – term life insurance – it enables the policyholder to pass on
bequests to children or other beneficiaries if he or she dies before a certain point in
time (the end of the term). However, in many countries, life insurance products are
a popular savings vehicle for old age as well. Under whole life insurance contracts,
the insurer faces a certain liability over the whole lifetime of the insured, for which
the insurer accumulates reserves during the working life of the policyholder.
Typically, the policyholder has the right to withdraw the savings component in old
age, provided he or she survives. As a result, under whole life insurance term life in-
surance provisions are coupled with a savings contract. This savings component of
whole life insurance often receives tax preferences, which increase its attractiveness
relative to other investments when marginal taxes are raised.
A number of papers in the economics literature model the demand for term life in-
surance. Term insurance pays a benefit if the insured dies before a certain date. The
first model of term life insurance in a continuous time setting is introduced by Yaari
(1965). Fischer (1973) develops a life cycle model of term life-insurance demand in
discrete time and discusses the allocation of insurance purchases over the life cycle.
Less common is the modeling of whole life insurance. Whole life insurance requires
the build-up of insurance reserves because the insured typically pays premiums only
during working life. These premiums must also finance later obligations. Many
whole life insurance contracts enable the insured to take out those reserves (the
cash value or surrender value) after a certain age, and therefore resemble a combin-
ation of term life insurance with a savings plan. Babbel and Ohtsuka (1989) build a
three-period model with uncertainty about future rates of return and health status
that allows for simultaneous purchase of term life insurance and whole life insurance,
overcoming the problem that whole life insurance is usually dominated by a combin-
ation of term life insurance and a savings plan. However, their model is inherently
difficult to solve even with sophisticated numerical methods. Moreover, Babbel and
Ohtsuka do not capture the effect of tax preferences on life-insurance demand.
This paper derives life-insurance demand in a model with a ‘joy-of-giving’ bequest
motive following the standard approach in the literature (one exception is Lewis,
1989). The model has three periods and three types of assets: life insurance, bonds,
and public pensions. Life insurance is modeled as a combination of term life insurance
and a savings plan. Our specification incorporates the salient features of the German
tax and pension system, but abstracts from certain favors in the German tax system
for building savings contracts and some risky assets, such as stocks or business
capital.2
In the three-period model, the timing convention used is as follows: consumption
streams in the three periods are indexed by 0, 1, and 2, and end-of-period bequests
are indexed by 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A consumer can use his income to purchase
life insurance L at a price Z per unit, or save an amount S of bonds. Bonds earn a rate
of return r and the return is subject to a capital income tax of τC. Moreover, indivi-
duals must contribute to a public pension system with a payroll tax τS and they receive
pensions in old age. The pension system has an internal rate of return of g.
2 This model was first presented by Walliser and Winter (1999).
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More formally, consider the following expected utility function in consumption, c,
and bequests, b:












where δ represents the pure rate of time preference, γ is the risk aversion parameter of
the constant relative risk aversion utility function, η is the weight on bequests, and πt is
the probability to survive at the beginning of period t. Since death at the end of period
2 is certain, π3 = 0.
To simplify notation, let 1 + r =R, 1 + r(1− τC) =RC, and 1 + g=G. The utility
maximization is then subject to the following budget constraints in the first two per-
iods (t= 0, 1):
ct = wt(1− τS) − ZtLt+1 − St+1 + StRC + αLt, (2)
bt+1 = St+1R+ Lt+1. (3)
Here, w stands for labor earnings. α is the exogenous savings portion of the life in-
surance contract – if the policy holder survives, a fraction of the insurance sum (the
cash value) can be withdrawn. Note also that in case of death the estate receives
the full rate of return on bonds, implicitly assuming that there are no estate taxes
to be paid.
Consumers retire in their third period of life and receive a public pension. Since life
ends with certainty after period 2, there is no role for life insurance in the last period.
Consequently, the budget constraints are as follows:
c2 = τS(w0G2 + w1G) − S3 + S2RC + αL2, (4)
b3 = S3R. (5)
The first-order conditions imply the following relationship between consumption in
different periods and for consumption and bequest in periods t= 1, 2:
ct
ct−1






= (1− πt)ηt(1− Zt−1R)[πt/(1+ δ)](RCZt−1 − α)
[ ]−(1/γ)
. (7)
Bequests at the end of period 2 are simply
b3 = c2(Rη3)1/γ. (8)
Using equations (6)–(8), the consumer’s maximization problem can be solved recur-
sively. The algebraic solution is fairly complicated and therefore provides few imme-
diate insights (see the Appendix). However, the first-order conditions offer some
qualitative predictions for variations in key variables. In general, people buy life in-
surance for three reasons in our model: first, life insurance enhances bequeathable
wealth and is therefore valuable especially at younger ages when savings are still
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small. Second, life insurance has a tax advantage over other savings. Third, if the con-
sumer considers public pension coverage as too generous he can de-annuitize by pur-
chasing life insurance.3
Consider first the impact of tax changes on portfolio choices. Suppose two house-
holds have the same household income but differ in their tax rate on capital income
τC. According to equations (6) and (7), the two households would differ in their con-
sumption, bequest, and portfolio choices. As indicated by equation (6), a household
facing a higher tax rate (lower RC) would choose a flatter consumption profile because
lower after-tax rates of return make future consumption more costly. As shown in
equation (7), that household would also choose to bequeath more than the household
facing lower tax since higher taxes make future consumption more costly but do not
affect the implicit price for bequests. Equations (6) and (7) and the budget constraints
also imply a different portfolio choice. For reasonable parameter choices, the house-
hold with higher tax rates can satisfy (6) and (7) simultaneously only if it holds more
life insurance and less savings than the household with lower tax rates. Increasing life
insurance by a dollar and lowering savings by a dollar in period 0 raises consumption
by 1−Z0 dollars. Under the assumption that insurance is fair, Z0 = [(1− π1)/R] +
(απ1/R), which is less than 1, the reallocation thus increases resources in the first
period. It lowers resources in the following period by α−RC which is negative for rea-
sonable parameter choices.4 Moreover, such a reallocation reduces bequests by 1−R,
which is larger than α−RC, as long as (R− 1)τc+ α is less than 1, which again is the
case for reasonable parameter choices, implying that bequests decline by less than
resources for future consumption.5 In summary, reallocating a dollar from savings
to life insurance increases current resources, lowers future resources, and lowers future
resources for consumption more than for bequests.
An analogous argument holds for changes in the parameter α that determines the
savings content of whole life insurance. Increasing α has the same effect on first-order
conditions as increasing the tax rate on capital income. Thus, quite intuitively, equa-
tions (6) and (7) together with the budget constraints also predict that increasing the
implicit savings portion of life insurance leads households to shift more resources
away from regular savings towards life insurance.
As equation (7) demonstrates, increasing the strength of bequest motives leads to
the result that the relative size of bequest to consumption must increase, while the
3 Yaari (1965) discusses why in perfect markets purchasing life insurance is equivalent to purchasing a
negative annuity. In our model, varying the size of the public pension system matters for both saving
and life insurance. As is well known, public pensions crowd out private savings in a life-cycle model.
To the extent that life insurance is a savings instrument, one would therefore expect life-insurance de-
mand to fall. However, for people who feel that the public pension is too generous, purchasing more
life insurance is a way to increase bequest and reduce the ‘over-annuitization’. Thus, the precise effect
of public pension coverage on life-insurance demand depends on the relative magnitude of the savings
and bequest motives.
4 For example, assuming interest rates of 3% per year, a value of α of around 0.2 implies in a three period
model that the accumulation of reserves in the first period of life is reduced by roughly 80% of paid life
insurance premiums.
5 For instance, for α= 0.2, and interest rates of 3% per year, bequests will be reduced by 3 cents, while
resources for future consumption decline by roughly 80 cents per dollar of paid life insurance premium.
(R− 1)τc+ α will be smaller than 1 as long as the product rτc is small, since the savings content α is by
definition smaller than one.
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relative size of consumption in different periods remains constant according to equa-
tion (6). Clearly, the less costly way to increase bequests is to purchase more life in-
surance. However, unlike the previous results, it depends on specific parameter
values whether both saving and life insurance increase or whether life-insurance de-
mand increases and savings falls.6
To summarize, the stylized life-cycle model presented in this section delivers two
main testable predictions regarding life-insurance demand. First, controlling for in-
come, consumers facing higher relative tax rates on other savings should purchase
more whole life insurance to accommodate a flatter consumption profile. Second, peo-
ple with stronger bequest motives are expected to be more responsive to changes in tax
rates.
4 Empirical specification
We use a linear and a non-linear difference-in-differences estimator to test if a treat-
ment group that is affected by the tax change is more likely to own one or more (tax-
exempt) life insurance policies after the reform relative to a control group that is not
affected. In the first step, we estimate a linear reduced-form model that does not con-
trol for other covariates in order to analyze the effect of tax reform on life-insurance
demand. In particular, a before-and-after comparison is made between a control
group of households that are unaffected by the reform with a treatment group that
is affected by the new tax regime, using a difference-in-differences estimator on
repeated cross-sectional data. We denote household i’s binary indicator for the treat-
ment group as Gi. The treated are defined as Git = 1{limit
new4 INCit4 limit
old},
where INCit denotes total interest and dividend income. Ti = 1{t5 1999} is a time
dummy indicating the anticipated reform. To ease the notational burden, we intro-
duce the shorthand Yi∈g,t forYi|Gi = g,Ti = t. The potential outcomes with and with-
out treatment are Y 1i and Y
0
i , respectively. The model for the outcome without
intervention is given by
Y 0i = αTi + βGi + ei,
where ei ⊥ (Ti, Gi). The model for the treatment group is
Y 1i = α+ β + τDiD + ei.
In the absence of intervention, the average outcome for the treatment group is
E[Y 0i[1,1] = E[Yi[1,0] + E[Yi[0,1] − E[Yi[0,0]. The average treatment effect on the
treated is defined as
τDiD =E[Y 1i[1,1] − E[Y 0i[1,1]
=E[Yi[1,1] − E[Yi[1,0] − (E[Yi[0,1] − E[Yi[0,0]).
(9)
6 In the extreme case of zero bequest motives, i.e., η= 0, only the rate of return of life insurance relative to
regular savings plays a role. This leads to corner solutions in which savings are either allocated entirely to
regular savings or to life insurance. Changes in life insurance demand would then only be observed if tax
swings are so large that the implied changes in relative rates of return induce a shift from life insurance to
regular savings or vice versa.
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This estimator requires three identifying assumptions. First, we assume that the tax
reform is exogenous with respect to the ownership decision. Households were hit by
surprise when the tax reforms were announced in 1999, since the reforms were men-
tioned neither in election campaigns nor in the coalition program of the incoming
government, which took office in 1998. We can also safely exclude the possibility
of policy endogeneity, because the reform was not introduced to change the demand
for life insurance by different taxpayer groups. It was part of a major tax reform pack-
age with the aim of broadening the tax base. Second, we assume that there are no
group-specific trends in life insurance ownership. This assumption guarantees that
the counterfactual of the treated can be inferred from the time trend of the control
group. As discussed above, at the extensive margin, this assumption certainly holds
for households above the new exemption limit. Third, we assume that the sample
composition is exogenous to the tax reform. Essentially, this requires that interest
and dividend income did not change as a result of the tax reform itself. This condition
would fail if interest and dividend income fell because a formerly treated household
bought life insurance in response to the reform. However, the presence of such wealth
effects would bias the results against our hypothesis and the estimated treatment effect
towards zero, as households buying life insurance would drop out of the treatment
group.
The above estimates may be biased for two reasons. First, in the linear probability
model, the estimated probabilities of investing into life insurance do not necessarily lie
in the [0, 1] interval. Second, the effects could be blurred because other determinants
account for different behavior across groups.
In a second step, we thus translate the difference-in-differences approach into a pro-
bit regression that imposes bounds on the estimated probabilities and accounts for
other covariates. The probit model for the outcome without intervention is given by
P(Y 0i = 1|Gi,Ti, xi) = Φ(αTi + βGi + xiδ),
where x is a vector of additional regressors and δ denotes the vector of associated
parameters. The model for the treatment group is
P(Y 1i[1,1 = 1|xi) = Φ(α+ β + γ+ xiδ),
Puhani (2012) shows that in a non-linear model, such as probit, the treatment effect
on the treated should not be confused with the cross-derivative of the interaction term
(Ai and Norton, 2003). Based on the standard probit difference-in-differences model
P(Yi = 1|Gi,Ti, xi) = Φ(αTi + βGi + γTiGi + xiδ),
a consistent estimator of the treatment effect is





(Φ(α̂+ β̂ + γ̂+ xiδ̂) − Φ(α̂+ β̂ + xiδ̂)).
(10)
Hence, the treatment effect is zero if and only if the coefficient γ is zero. We apply
the delta method to infer statistical significance of the average treatment effect in
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small samples. Different from the linear model, identification is not provided by the
assumption that the cross difference γ is zero for the expected potential outcome
Y 0i , because group and time differences in the conditional expectation of the potential
outcome Y 0i are not constant in the non-linear probit model. However, a non-linear
parametric restriction on that cross-difference guarantees that all expected outcomes
(factual or counterfactual) are bounded as required (Athey and Imbens, 2006).
5 The data
The estimators are applied to data from the SOEP, which offers a unique opportunity
to test the predictions of the theoretical model regarding tax effects and bequest
motives in life insurance demand based on the German tax reform. It is the only data-
set that contains annual information about life insurance ownership and portfolio
choice of German households that spans from pre- to post-reform years. (Recall that
the reform we study took effect in 2000.) The first survey was conducted in 1984.
Since then, the sample has been significantly increased in 1998 and 2000. In Section
8, we also test for the robustness of the results when only the original sample was
used. Descriptive evidence for the development of the sample is provided in Table 2.7
Households are asked annually if they owned one or more life insurance policies in
the previous year. We therefore only use observations for households that take part in
two successive surveys, with the dependent variable entering with a one period lead. As
the survey does not contain any information on the nominal amount of life insurance
purchased, we are only able to analyze changes in demand at the extensive margin.
Moreover, the survey does unfortunately not distinguish between term and whole life
insurance policies. This is not expected to significantly affect out estimates, however,
for which the whole-life component is crucial, because whole life insurance is in general
the dominant type in Germany, with term life policies only accounting for about one-
quarter of all contracts at the time (GDV, 2003a and 2003b). Moreover, at the macro-
level, the ownership pattern and purchases of term life policies remained broadly stable
during the period of observation (compare Figure 1). The survey contains similar yes/
no questions for ownership of other assets such as savings accounts, stocks/mutual
funds/bonds, building savings contracts, and business capital. However, information
on households’ overall wealth or overall asset holdings is not available in the SOEP
or in any other German microdata survey conducted during the relevant period.
As for the other covariates, it is noteworthy to describe the approximation of mar-
ginal tax rates, which is done in two steps. First, (estimated) tax payments, which are
available in the SOEP, are transformed back into the household’s taxable income,
using the official tax formulas from the federal tax office that applied in each year.8
Second, the household’s marginal tax rate is calculated based on the derived taxable
7 The add-on package PanelWhiz for Stata (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for extracting the
data. See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The Stata program that extracts the SOEP
data was generated using PanelWhiz; it is available upon request. Any data or computational errors
are our own.
8 The SOEP estimates of total tax payments are based on Schwarze’s (1995) approach. Schwarze adds up
the incomes of all household members and applies standard deductions based on the socioeconomic sta-
tus of the household.
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income and the marital status of the household. Socioeconomic characteristics are
proxied by those of the household head.
In the next two sections, we use the analytic dataset constructed from the SOEP to
analyze tax incentives and bequest motives, respectively.
6 Tax incentives
The unusually high popularity of life insurance in Germany is thought to be its favor-
able fiscal treatment (particularly of whole life insurance); see Sommer (2007), inter
alia. First, returns on life insurance are tax exempt if the contract lasts for at least
12 years, premiums are paid during at least 5 years, and the term life insurance com-
ponent amounts to at least 60% of the total benefit paid out at the end of the contract.
Second, annual contributions to whole life and term life insurance contracts are tax
deductible. However, this is typically of little benefit for employees, as they reach
the deductibility cap with their obligatory contributions to the social security system.
Obligatory contributions are smaller for civil servants and the deductibility cap is
higher for the self-employed, who are generally exempted from contributing to the
public pension system and must provide for their own retirement income and survi-
vor’s benefits (Sommer, 2007). Our analysis includes controls for the self-employed
and civil servants to account for these variations in effective deductibility. Finally,
in the case of bequests, only two-thirds of the cash values of life insurance policies
are taxed.
Figure 1. (colour online) The graph depicts the insured
volume of new term and whole life insurance contracts
from 1996–2003 with first premium paid in billion euro in
Germany. Whole life insurance comprises traditional
contracts and contracts where the savings component of
the life insurance contract is channeled into a mutual fund
or pension plan.
Source: GDV (2003b).
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6.1 The reform of the tax exemption limit
The German state taxes all personal interest and dividend income exceeding a certain
threshold at the households’ marginal tax rate. The development of this threshold, the
so-called Sparerfreibetrag (tax exemption limit), is shown in Table 1 for the period
from 1996 to 2001. In March 1999, a law was passed, cutting the tax exemption
limit from Deutsche Mark (DM) DM12,000 to DM6,000 for couples and
DM6,000 to DM3,000 for singles from January 1, 2000 onward. We suspect that
households between the old and the new tax exemption limits were disproportionately
affected by this reform. As their interest and dividend income was fully exempted
from taxation beforehand, the reform created a strong incentive to shelter their
Table 1. Tax exemption limits on interest and dividend income
Treatment group [reported
precisely]
Treatment group [reported on
categorical scale]
limitnew− limitold ˜limitnew − ˜limitold
Single 3,000–6,000 DM 2,000–5,000 DM
Couple 6,000–12,000 DM 5,000–10,000 DM
Note: The tax exemption limit for interest and dividend income was cut to half in Germany in
2000. The table describes the treatment group, which are all households with interest and divi-
dend income above the new and below the old tax exemption limit. The thresholds for singles
for the old and new exemption limits, limitold = 6, 000 DM and limitnew= 3, 000 DM (or twice
these amounts for couples) define the treatment group. As survey respondents can either report
their precise income or tick one of six pre-defined income ranges, the interest and dividend in-
come for the latter can only be approximated from the categorical scale. About two-thirds of
households chose to report their income on the categorical scale (indicated by tilde).
Table 2. Average life insurance ownership rates 1996–2001
As % of all observations in the subpopulation
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Full sample 54.7 55.8 54.6 55.3 54.7 52.4
N 6,594 6,383 7,159 6,980 11,662 11,193
INC < limitnew 54.3 55.5 54.2 54.6 54.1 52.0
N 6,278 6,092 6,816 6,508 10,853 10,553
limitnew < INC < limitold 62.7 58.5 62.5 69.7 64.0 65.1
N 225 195 232 284 478 315
INC > limitold 64.8 67.7 60.4 62.6 63.1 62.3
N 91 96 111 163 225 175
Note: The table reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies for different subpopu-
lations that are below, between or above the new and old tax exemption limits. INC denotes
total interest and dividend income.
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savings from taxation by purchasing whole life insurance when the reform was
announced. In other words, if these households were responsive to the relative tax
treatment, we should see a disproportionate increase of life insurance purchases
among the group threatened to have their interest and dividend income taxed. In
what follows, we denote households belonging to this category as the ‘treatment
group’.
In order to identify the treatment group, we rely on a survey question that leaves it
to the household whether to report its income from interest and dividends as the pre-
cise amount or within a range on an ordinal scale. Not surprisingly, three-quarters of
households chose the ordinal response form, which offers ranges of less than 500, be-
tween 500 and 2,000, 2,000 and 5,000, 5,000 and 10,000, or above 10,000 DM. For
these responses, we use the range between 2,000 and 5,000 DM to approximate house-
holds in the treatment group, or 5,000–10,000 DM in the case of married couples.
While the ordinal thresholds may reduce the precision of the estimated response of
the treatment group to tax changes, this attenuation bias will bias the results against
finding significant differences between groups.9
We use a difference-in-differences estimator to test if the treatment group is more
likely to own one or more (tax-exempt) life insurance policies from 1999 onward.
The choice of 1999 as reference year is motivated by the fact that the tax law was al-
ready passed in March 1999, so that households could anticipate the reform.
Moreover, purchases were fostered by a parallel government proposal in June 1999,
which wanted to abolish the tax exemption on life insurance returns altogether by
the end of 1999. This second proposal eventually failed in the upper house of parlia-
ment (the Bundesrat) in mid-December, but was a strong driver of the anticipation
effects until then.10 Dolle-Helms (1999a, 1999b) provides anecdotal evidence that
last minute purchases in 1999 were significant and largely driven by tax motives.
The importance of anticipation effects is also confirmed by Figure 1, which shows
the total insured volume of new whole and term life insurance contracts in
Germany. While the value of term policies sold remains broadly stable over the entire
sample, whole life insurance sales spike in 1999 and remain high thereafter. The sales
of whole life contracts between 1996 and 1998 amount to an average insured volume
of 115 billion Euro per year, while the average insured volume sold between 1999 and
2001 increased to 159 billion Euro.
Furthermore, the reform of the tax exemption limit may also have had an impact
on households above the old exemption threshold, as their total taxable income from
interest and dividends increased by the reduction in the exemption limit. These
wealthy households should already have a tax incentive to buy life insurance before
the reform, however. As the dependent variable does not allow distinguishing buyers
of a second or third insurance policy, i.e., it does not measure changes at the intensive
9 For example, Lewbel (2007) shows that failure to account for misclassification in a binary treatment vari-
able results in attenuation bias in the estimated treatment effect.
10 The second reform was eventually passed a few years later and entered into force on January 2005.
Sauter and Winter (2010) find a significant increase in life insurance sales in anticipation of this reform,
which is even visible in a sharp upward-sloping increase in Google searches of the German term
‘Lebensversicherung’ (life insurance) towards the end of 2004.
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margin, we do not expect a significant response to the reform among this group of
households. Still, we test if the ownership probability among the treatment group
increases relative to households whose interest and dividend income already exceeded
the old exemption limit. The implicit underlying identifying assumption is that both
the treatment and the wealthy control group responded equally (in proportional
terms) to the announcement of the reforms.
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show that significant changes in life insur-
ance ownership, i.e., at the extensive margin, occurred only in the treatment group.
Life insurance ownership rates remained constant among households below the new
tax exemption limit and above the old exemption limit. However, the ownership
rate increased strongly from 62.5% to 69.7% in the treatment group in 1999 and
remained at an elevated level thereafter. In line with the macro evidence, this indicates
that households affected by the tax reform increased their life insurance demand in
response to the tax reform, and largely anticipated their purchases in 1999 when
the reform was announced.
6.2 Unconditional estimates from a linear probability model
The upper panel of Table 3 reports the average effects of the tax reform, using a sam-
ple from 3 years before and after the announcement of the reform. While ownership
rates of life insurance declined somewhat among households in the control group
from 1999 onwards, an increase by 4.5% can be observed for the treatment group.
The difference-in-differences estimate according to equation (9) is 5.7% for the full
sample and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. For households
above the new exemption limit the estimate is of similar size, i.e., 5.9%. Due to the
smaller sample size, however, the t-statistic does not indicate statistical significance
at common confidence bounds.
6.3 Conditional estimates from a probit model
The probit model also controls for a number of additional covariates, whose summary
statistics are reported in Table 4. In particular, we include the marginal tax rate to
control for differences in after-tax returns. We proxy for the household’s net labor in-
come via binary indicators for deciles of the income distribution, suppressing the
dummy for the median percentile.
Dummies for house ownership as well as interest and dividend returns control for
household wealth, where the lowest interest and dividend income category is sup-
pressed (i.e., below DM500). Furthermore, binary indicators for marital status and
households with one or more children living in the household are added to capture
bequest motives as used for instance by Hurd (1987, 1989). Dummies for employment
status, civil servants, and the self-employed reflect specific characteristics of the
German tax and public pension system. Finally, the model includes gender and edu-
cation dummies, as well as linear and non-linear terms of the age of the household
head. We use data for 3 years before and after the reform. The full sample consists
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of 44,540 observations and 2,419 if we constrain the analysis to households above the
new exemption limit.
Table 5 reports average marginal effects for continuous and dummy variables. The
interaction effect τ̂DiD is statistically significant at the 5% level in both equations.
According to equation (10), the reform increased ownership among households
affected by the reduction of the tax exemption limit by 5.2%. The estimate is 8.9%
for the restricted sample in column (2). These effects hold even after controlling for
the marginal tax rate that applies to the household.
Our results contrast with those of Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, 2007) who do not
find that tax incentives matter for life-insurance demand in Italy. The authors men-
tioned that marketing efforts by Italian insurers did not sufficiently advertise the
change in tax incentives following reforms in Italy. By contrast, anecdotal evidence
suggests that sales agents exploited the favorable market situation in Germany deriv-
ing from the tax changes. Moreover, the tax incentive resulting from incremental
changes in after-tax yields in Italy might have been too small to induce significant
changes in investment behavior. In Germany, the reduction of the exemption limit im-
plied that, on previously exempted interest and dividend income, some households
could reduce their marginal tax rate of up to 51% in 2000 to 0% by rising the share
of life insurance in their portfolios. The estimated effects should therefore be inter-
preted as local average treatment effects, as only a small group of rich households
that are sensitive to exogenous changes in after-tax returns responded to the tax




Linear probability model (unconditional)
N 1,729 47,961 49,690
After the reform 0.658 (0.017)*** 0.536 (0.004)*** 0.123 (0.017)*** 29,554
Before the reform 0.613 (0.025)*** 0.548 (0.005)*** 0.066 (0.025)*** 20,136
Difference within groups 0.045 (0.025)* −0.012 (0.004)*** 0.057 (0.026)**
Linear probability model (unconditional), INC > limitnew
N 1,729 861 2,590
After the reform 0.658 (0.017)*** 0.627 (0.025)*** 0.031 (0.028) 1,640
Before the reform 0.613 (0.025)*** 0.641 (0.037)*** −0.027 (0.042) 950
Difference within groups 0.045 (0.025)* −0.014 (0.034) 0.059 (0.043)
Note: The upper panel reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies for the years
1996–2001. The bottom panel reports averages for all households with INC > limitnew. The un-
conditional difference-in-differences estimate from a linear probability model based on equa-
tion (9) is reported in bold face in the bottom right cell of each panel. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the household level. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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change. The Italian tax reform applied to a wider set of households, which may also
explain the less pronounced sensitivity to the tax reform.
7 Bequest motives
From the theoretical model in Section 3, we derived two predictions with respect to
bequests. First, a larger bequest motive raises demand for life insurance. Second,
the response to tax changes is expected to be larger among households with stronger
bequest motives.
When bringing these hypotheses of the model to the data, we face the problem that
the SOEP provides asset ownership information only at the household level, whereas
the theoretical model is developed in terms of a representative agent. It neither
Table 4. Summary statistics
Full sample INC > limitnew
Marginal tax rate 0.249 0.338
Woman D 0.376 0.277
Age 48.87 52.39
Children D 0.340 0.218
Married D 0.829 0.730
10 years schooling D 0.280 0.250
13 years schooling D 0.200 0.424
College D 0.086 0.132
University D 0.100 0.240
Self-employed D 0.057 0.136
Civil servant D 0.045 0.070
Retired D 0.283 0.320
Unemployed D 0.078 0.035
Household income decile 1 D 0.099 0.026
Household income decile 2 D 0.103 0.039
Household income decile 3 D 0.097 0.054
Household income decile 4 D 0.101 0.070
Household income decile 6 D 0.111 0.100
Household income decile 7 D 0.097 0.078
Household income decile 8 D 0.097 0.111
Household income decile 9 D 0.099 0.174
Household income decile 10 D 0.094 0.284
Owns house D 0.405 0.632
500< returns < 2,000 DM D 0.231
Returns < 5,000 DM D 0.084
Returns < 10,000 DM D 0.033
Returns > 10,000 DM D 0.016
N 44,540 2,419
Sample years 1996–2001 1996–2001
Note: The samples are from the SOEP. Demographic variables refer to the household head.
Dummy variables are marked by D.
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Table 5. Tax incentives – conditional difference-in-differences estimates
(1) (2)






τ̂DiD D 0.052** (0.024) 0.089** (0.046)
T D 0.010 (0.006) −0.040 (0.037)
G D −0.006 (0.021) −0.057 (0.036)
Marginal tax rate 0.329*** (0.026) 0.250*** (0.089)
Woman D 0.003 (0.008) −0.075** (0.031)
Age/10 0.153*** (0.017) 0.102* (0.056)
(Age/10)2 −0.021*** (0.002) −0.017*** (0.005)
Children D −0.000 (0.009) 0.033 (0.035)
Married D 0.062*** (0.012) 0.099*** (0.037)
10 years schooling D 0.059*** (0.009) −0.037 (0.035)
13 years schooling D 0.003 (0.012) −0.096*** (0.036)
College D 0.005 (0.014) 0.048 (0.039)
University D −0.024 (0.015) −0.002 (0.040)
Self-employed D 0.044*** (0.014) 0.020 (0.041)
Civil servant D 0.025 (0.018) −0.002 (0.048)
Retired D −0.008 (0.013) −0.078* (0.044)
Unemployed D −0.022** (0.011) 0.031 (0.057)
Household income decile 1 D −0.173*** (0.014) −0.035 (0.084)
Household income decile 2 D −0.082*** (0.013) 0.060 (0.063)
Household income decile 3 D −0.068*** (0.013) −0.018 (0.061)
Household income decile 4 D −0.040*** (0.011) 0.029 (0.051)
Household income decile 6 D 0.023** (0.011) 0.047 (0.047)
Household income decile 7 D 0.030** (0.012) 0.054 (0.050)
Household income decile 8 D 0.039*** (0.012) 0.045 (0.048)
Household income decile 9 D 0.044*** (0.013) 0.075 (0.046)
Household income decile 10 D 0.068*** (0.014) 0.156*** (0.041)
Owns house D 0.071*** (0.008) 0.057* (0.029)
500 < returns < 2,000 DM D 0.080*** (0.007)
Returns < 5,000 DM D 0.034*** (0.011)
Returns < 10,000 DM D 0.030* (0.016)





χ2(prob.) 3,249.2 (0.000) 275.9 (0.000)
Sample years 1996–2001 1996–2001
The table reports estimates from a probit model that conditions on a large set of covariates.
The treatment effect τ̂DiD is estimated based on equation (10). Average marginal effects are
reported. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. The right column
runs the regression for a sub-sample of wealthy households above the new exemption limit,
INC > limitnew. D indicates dummy variables. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.













ünchen , on 29 N
ov 2018 at 11:57:22 , subject to the Cam
bridge Core term






captures intra-household resource reallocation motives, nor is an overlapping genera-
tions model in which only children receive bequests. The set-up of the model allows
for any person to be the beneficiary as long as it is stipulated in the insurance policy.
Observing a larger response to the tax reform among households with children or
married couples (i.e., those with potentially stronger bequest motives) would therefore
be a sufficient test for the predictions of the model. However, when using a dummy for
married couples as a proxy for bequest motives, some noise is introduced into the em-
pirical specification, as all variables are observed at the household level while the the-
oretical model should in principle be applied to individuals, given that it does not
explicitly deal with within couple resource allocation.
For the purpose at hand, however, it is not necessary to extend the model, as typical
reasons for life insurance ownership of married couples can be interpreted as a larger
η, i.e., stronger bequest incentives that are not related to other parameters of the
model. Such reasons could for instance be income inequality within the household
or estate tax incentives.11 In order to ensure that the treatment effect for married
households is estimated with sufficient precision, what is crucial is that both indivi-
duals within the household face the same tax rate. Such equalization of tax rates is
ensured by the so-called income splitting mechanism of the German tax system.12
Regarding the first hypothesis, we find that life insurance demand is higher for mar-
ried couples but not for households with children.13 The estimates in column (1) of
Table 5 show that, ceteris paribus, married couples (who tend to have a higher pref-
erence for bequeathing wealth) have, on average, a 6.2% stronger demand for life in-
surance. By contrast, the presence of children seems not significantly related to life
insurance demand, which has also been found by Jürges (2001) based on SOEP
data. One reason for this result could be that the indicator for households with chil-
dren is an incomplete proxy variable that due to the nature of the questionnaire does
not cover bequest motives to older children who do not live in the household
anymore.
In addition to this mixed general evidence for the importance of bequest motives,
Table 6 shows unconditional and conditional difference-in-differences estimates
related to the second hypothesis on the impact of the tax reform on different groups
of households. In particular, we compare the impact between married and unmarried
households as well as households with and without children. Looking at the upper
panel with unconditional difference-in-difference estimates, married households in
the treatment group appear more likely to respond to the tax reform than unmarried
11 For example, if the husband pays premiums into a life insurance policy owned by the wife who also is the
beneficiary, if he dies early, and vice versa, the paid out sum for one spouse would not be subject to estate
taxes. The overall amount subject to estate taxes would thus be halved in case one spouse dies early.
12 In fact, the estimates will be biased against finding a significant response, as in some households only one
spouse may have sizable bequest motives but may lack bargaining power in the intra-household resource
allocation.
13 With regard to a potential ‘overannuitization’ effect, which for certain parameters could be a prediction
of the model, we find no evidence. Civil servants, who typically receive generous survivor benefits and
may thus be the most likely group to reduce its life insurance demand due to ‘overannuitization’,
show no significantly different demand pattern. At the same time, life insurance demand is higher
among the self-employed. This may be due to a specific feature of the German tax system, which pro-
vides larger tax incentives for owning life insurance and lower public pensions to this group.
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Table 6. Bequest motives – average marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married Unmarried With children Without children
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Linear probability model
(unconditional)
Treatment effect 0.064** (0.030) 0.043 (0.051) 0.047 (0.042) 0.045 (0.029)
N 40,375 8,270 16,549 33,141
Probit model (conditioned
on covariates)
τ̂DiD 0.064*** (0.027) 0.032 (0.051) 0.091* (0.057) 0.042* (0.027)
N 36,916 7,624 15,151 29,389
Pseudo-R2 0.183 0.111 0.123 0.164
Sample years 1996–2001 1996–2001 1996–2001 1996–2001
The upper panel reports unconditional difference-in-differences estimates of the treatment effect from a linear probability model based on equation (9).
Estimates are reported for different sub-samples, i.e., married/unmarried couples and households with/without children. The bottom panel reports aver-
age marginal effects from a probit regression that conditions on a large number of other covariates. The treatment effect τ̂DiD is estimated based on
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households. The unconditional increase in life insurance ownership is statistically
significant at 6.4% for married households. By contrast, no significant impact of
the tax reform can be detected for the unmarried, and for households with or without
children.14
Conditional estimates for the different sub-groups, based on equation (10), are
reported in the lower panel of Table 6. The conditional probability of owning life in-
surance is 6.4% higher among married households affected by the tax reform. At the
same time, we still find no statistically significant effect of the reform on unmarried
households. This may indicate that the tax changes were not large enough to induce
a change in life insurance among low-bequest households. Overall, the conditional ef-
fect of the tax reform for married households is of a similar magnitude as in the un-
conditional case.
For households with children, after controlling for other covariates, the estimated
effect is larger than in the unconditional cases, with life insurance demand estimated
to increase by 9.1% in response to the reform. Childless households increase their life
insurance demand only by 4.2%, on average. However, for the case with children, it is
noted that the estimates are only statistically significant at the 10% level.
8 Robustness checks
In order to assess the robustness of the estimates, we run several alternative specifica-
tions. One obvious source of concern is that the enlargement of the sample by about
3,500 households in 2000 biases the estimates and drives our findings. To control for
this effect, we restrict the analysis solely to households from the original sample.
Column (1) of Table 7 shows the estimated treatment effects for all households in
the original sample. The unconditional estimate of 6.4% turns out to be of similar
size as in the enlarged sample (5.7%), and is statistically significant at the 5% confi-
dence level. Similarly, the conditional estimate is significant and of similar size as
in the enlarged sample. Moreover, when we restrict the original sample to households
above the new exemption limit, as is done in column (4), we also find statistically sign-
ificant estimates with treatment effects of similar magnitude as for the enlarged
sample, i.e., around 8%. We therefore conclude that the refreshment of the sample
does not appear to bias our findings in a noteworthy manner.
As a next step, we want to rule out that our findings are solely driven by the strong
increase in life insurance demand that was observed in 1999. In columns (2) and (5),
observations for the year 1999 are therefore suppressed from the regressions. The esti-
mates in column (2) show that, for both the unconditional and conditioned estimates
neither the point estimates nor the standard errors change in a significant manner.
However, when running the same exercise for the smaller sample of wealthy house-
holds, we cannot find a statistically significant effect for the unconditioned linear
14 For the latter group, the limited effect at the extensive margin may be due to the fact that a noteworthy
85% of households with children in the treatment group owned one or more life insurance policies
already before the reform. However, changes at the intensive margin, which are not tested for in this
paper, could well be significant for this group.
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Table 7. Robustness checks – estimated treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Original sample Original sample, INC > limitold
Excl. 1999 1997–2000 Excl. 1999 1997–2000
Linear probability model (unconditional)
Difference within+ groups 0.064 (0.026)** 0.051 (0.029)* 0.071 (0.030)** 0.075 (0.044)* 0.060 (0.051) 0.071 (0.050)
N 40,528 33,573 27,293 2,078 1,631 1,482
Probit model (conditioned on covariates)
τ̂DiD 0.054 (0.025)** 0.053 (0.028)* 0.068 (0.027)** 0.080 (0.040)** 0.084 (0.045)* 0.075 (0.044)*
N 37,184 30,753 25,155 1,950 1,522 1,405
Note: The table reports regression results for the original sample, not taking into account the enlargement of the survey sample in 2000. The
difference-in-difference estimates are reported for different subsamples of the unconditioned linear probability model based on equation (9) and a probit
model that conditions on a large set of covariates. For the probit model, the treatment effect τ̂DiD is estimated based on equation (10). The sub-sample of
wealthy households above the new exemption limit is denoted as INC >limitnew. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the house-
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probability estimate anymore. Still, the conditioned probit estimate in the lower panel
is similar to that from the full sample and also statistically significant.
Moreover, it is assessed if a narrower estimation window around the reform date
would affect our conclusions. We therefore reduce the 3 to a 2 year estimation window
ranging from 1997 to 2000. Column (3) shows that the estimates remain statistically
significant and of similar size as in the wider estimation window, although the effects
are estimated with less precision since standard errors increase. This effect is even
more evident in the smaller sample of wealthy households. In column (6), estimates
are only significant at the 10% level in the case of the conditional estimates and not
significant anymore in the case of the unconditional estimates, although the point esti-
mates are quite similar to those from the full sample. One explanation for this lower
statistical significance is that the number of observations of wealthy households has
nearly been halved by running the regressions on the narrower window compared
with the enlarged sample.
Finally, we explore if the estimated effect of the reform can only be established for
life insurance ownership or is also observable for other asset groups. Variation in
asset-specific sensitivities may reveal substitution among different assets, whereas a
similar reaction across all assets could indicate that the treatment group reacted to
the reform by increasing its overall saving. Hence, we estimate equations (9) and
(10) by replacing the dependent variable with an indicator of ownership of: savings
accounts, securities (not distinguishing between stocks and/or bonds), building savings
contracts, and business capital in a company owned by a household member. Except
for savings accounts, the other three assets also benefit of certain tax favors. For in-
stance, building savings are tax deductible, and fringe benefits received in the form of
building savings payments are exempt from taxation. Unincorporated business capital
was traditionally taxed at the income tax rate, but in a move to promote investment, a
parallel corporate tax reform in 2000 allowed individuals to have it taxed at the cor-
porate tax rate, which is significantly lower. As for stocks, dividend payments are sub-
ject to regular income taxation, but at the time gains in the market value of the
security were exempt from taxation if sale and purchase were at least 1 year apart,
making long-term stock ownership attractive from a tax perspective.
Table 8 reports the estimated ownership rates broken down by treatment group as
well as unconditional and conditional treatment effects. The treated group reduced
participation in savings accounts and deposits from 93% before to 89% after the re-
form. However, this reduction is not statistically significant – which is not surprising
as one would expect changes in the use of savings accounts in response to the tax re-
form at the intensive rather than the extensive margin. Securities ownership increased
among the treated group but at a lesser rate than among the non-treated, resulting in a
negative or insignificant treatment effect. This surprising finding should in our view
not be over-interpreted, however as changes in stock ownership are likely driven by
the privatization of the German telecommunications company Deutsche Telekom
and the boom of the new economy stock market at the time. While both are aggregate
phenomena that affected the treated and the non-treated, we suspect it invalidated the
assumption of no group-specific trends which underlies the difference-in-differences
model. Specifically, in an unprecedented advertising campaign on television, stock
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Table 8. Robustness checks – estimated treatment effects for other asset classes






Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated
Asset ownership rates in %
After the reform 89.0 75.6 84.2 32.2 50.4 39.6 16.2 3.9
Before the reform 92.5 76.7 76.7 20.7 46.8 40.6 13.0 4.4
Linear probability model (unconditional)
Difference within groups −0.023 (0.014) −0.041 (0.021)* 0.047 (0.026)* 0.034 (0.019)*
N 49,690 49,690 49,690 49,690
Probit model (conditioned on covariates)
τ̂DiD −0.035 (0.022) 0.009 (0.028) 0.046 (0.022)** 0.026 (0.009)***
N 44,540 44,540 44,540 44,540
Note: The table reports ownership rates households of affected and unaffected by the tax reform (i.e., treated and non-treated) for four different assets
classes: savings accounts, securities, building savings contracts, and business capital. Three-year average ownership rates before (1996–1998) and after the
reform (1999–2001) are reported in the top panel. The difference-in-difference estimates are reported for the unconditioned linear probability model
based on equation (9) and a probit model that conditions on a large set of covariates. For the probit model, the treatment effect τ̂DiD is estimated
based on equation (10). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the household level.*, **, *** denote statistical significance at
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ownership was boosted particularly among households that had never owned stock
before. This is evident in Table 8, which reports an increase in participation from
77% before to 84% after the reform among the treated (high wealth) households,
while ownership rates of the non-treated (mainly low wealth) households surged
from 21% to 32%.
For building savings contracts and business capital, the treated show a significantly
higher ownership rate after the reform. Like life insurance, both asset classes benefit of
tax favors. Building savings contracts maintained a tax-favored treatment after the re-
form and the treated increased their participation at a roughly similar rate as for life
insurance (around 10% of the pre-reform mean). We test if this similar response has
implications for our findings on life insurance demand by controlling equation (10)
also for ownership of building savings contracts. While there is some positive correl-
ation between ownership of life insurance and building savings contracts, the esti-
mated effect of the reform on life insurance ownership is not significantly different
from the estimates reported in Table 5, with τ̂DiD equal to 4.3% and statistically sign-
ificant at the 5% level. For business capital, a favorable tax treatment was introduced
with the corporate tax reform in 2000, but at the same time it should be noted that
only around 5% of households in the overall sample own business capital, limiting
the lessons that can be drawn from these estimates for the overall population.
Overall, the estimated treatment effect on life insurance demand appears robust to a
general trend among the treatment group, as some substitution can be observed into
other asset classes, specifically from savings accounts into tax-favored assets.
However, these estimates are only representative of effects at the extensive margin.
Although these effects seem particularly relevant from a policy perspective, given
their discrete nature and the possible presence of entry costs, they do not allow
broader conclusions as to the implications of the reform on overall portfolio compos-
ition. An analysis of the latter would require data on overall savings that are unavail-
able in the SOEP. Nevertheless, some indication of changes in portfolio composition
can be seen in macro-economic data. Figure 2 shows the share of different assets in
total private wealth, as available from German financial accounts data. The share
of life insurance wealth rises from 2000 onward, while the share of savings accounts
and stocks declined.15 The decline in stocks is likely driven by mark-to-market valu-
ation changes following the bursting of the dotcom bubble, rather than active port-
folio rebalancing, given that households are typically unwilling to realize losses.
Therefore, we calculate the portfolio composition only for savings accounts/deposits,
life insurance, and bonds, based on which it seems not too far-fetched to conclude that
a portfolio shift from savings accounts towards life insurance occurred in response to
the tax reform. While the share of life insurance in this three-asset portfolio rose by 4
percentage points to 36% between 1998 and 2003, the share of savings accounts
declined by 4 percentage points to 53% over the same period. The share of bonds
remained constant at 11%.
15 The value of building savings contracts could not be shown separately, as German financial accounts
reported it under the composite item ‘savings accounts’ until 1998 and under term ‘deposits’ thereafter.
Hence, building savings are included in the overall composite of ‘savings accounts and deposits”.
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Whole life insurance plays an important role in household saving. In a stylized model,
both tax incentives and bequest motives drive whole life-insurance demand. While a
bequest motive could be satisfied by term life insurance, sheltering savings from cap-
ital gains taxes is only possible with whole life policies. The empirical evidence we pre-
sented in this paper is consistent with the predictions of a stylized model that captures
these incentives.
A tax reform that halved the tax exemption limit for interest and dividend income
in Germany can be seen as a natural experiment. Underpinned by a rich dataset, this
reform offers a rare opportunity to study the impact of increases in capital income
taxation on portfolio choice. We find that the tax change induced a significant in-
crease in ownership of tax-exempt assets. Participation in life insurance increased
significantly among the group of households that did not pay taxes on interest and
dividend income prior to the reform. Our difference-in-differences estimates imply
that the tax reform we studied increased life insurance ownership probabilities by
5.2 percentage points among the group of households affected by the reform. We
also tested if tax effects are larger among households with stronger bequest motives.
Due to the tax change, demand at the extensive margin rises by 6.4% for married cou-
ples and 9.1% for households with children, which is larger than the respective re-
sponse by unmarried and childless households.
These reduced-form estimates broadly support our theoretical model, thus indicat-
ing that bequests are indeed an important determinant of household savings decisions
rather than an accidental remnant of precautionary saving (Hurd, 1987). As micro-
data on overall household saving, or on the amounts saved by asset type, are
Figure 2. (colour online) The graph depicts the portfolio
composition of German households between 1996 and
2003. The share of each asset class is reported as a
percentage of total private wealth. The value of
outstanding building savings contracts is included in
savings and deposit account wealth.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2010).
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unavailable, it is not possible to ultimately establish whether increased participation in
tax-favored assets occurred at the expense of other assets or whether it was driven by
an increase in overall savings among those affected by the reform. However, we find
that the treated also increased their participation in other tax-favored assets such as
building savings contracts or business capital, while macro-economic financial
accounts data suggests a portfolio shift from savings accounts into life insurance
after the reform.
The estimated increase in life insurance participation in response to the tax change
raises the question of whether a symmetric decline in life insurance ownership would
be observed if the tax hike on regular savings were to be unwound in the future. From
a theoretical perspective, the answer is clearly yes in the chosen setting, although in a
more elaborate theoretical model with short-term liquidity constraints, the decline
may turn out relatively smaller, as the shift of 1$ from life insurance to regular savings
leads to a reduction in current resources for consumption in favor of future resources.
Giving up current consumption may not be optimal for constrained households if the
tax change were not expected to be permanent. More relevant from a practical point
of view is that life insurance contracts can usually only be sold back to the insurance
firm at a loss, as insurers keep potential excess gains on insurance reserves that would
only be due at the contractual maturity. Since households will try to avoid realizing
losses, overall life insurance ownership is likely to decline only gradually as contracts
mature, while new sales are likely to adjust quickly. This reasoning is confirmed by the
data. For example, Sauter and Winter (2010) show descriptively that the eventual
abolition of the tax advantage for life insurance in Germany in 2005 resulted in an
immediate drop in sales of new contracts. By contrast, ownership rates declined
only gradually from 52% in 2004 to 42% in 2011 according to the SOEP.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that static tax revenue estimates,
which do not account for participation responses to tax changes, may be misleading.
Our findings show that these effects are potentially non-negligible. Thus, policy
makers need to account for changes in investment behavior due to tax reforms, as
forcefully argued by Poterba and Verdugo (2011). In the light of the current concerns
about fiscal sustainability in advanced economies, this could become relevant as gov-
ernments seek new sources of revenues. Finally, our results show that increases in
taxes on interest and dividend income may raise participation in tax-favored assets,
such as life insurance policies. In that sense, an increase in these taxes may revive de-
mand for life insurance in countries where they benefit from tax favors, despite the
prevailing low interest rate environment.
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The solution for first period consumption c0 can be derived as follows:















1− Z1R Z1 − α
( ) (1− π2)η2 π11+ δ (RC − αR)2
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1− Z1R w1(1− τ
S) + τS(w0G2 + w1G)
]
The solution for c0 in combination with equations (6)–(8) immediately implies
values for c1, c2, b1, b2, b3 and thus, by applying the budget constraints, also for L1
and L2.
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